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‘The Secondary Sale, Copyright Conundrum – Why we need a secondary market for 
digital content’ 
 
Abstract 
 
This article considers the resale of digital copyright content.  Other jurisdictions, 
including the EU and the US have recently considered whether consumers have rights 
to buy and sell second hand digital content. In Australian copyright law, there is no 
clear principle of first sale or exhaustion that positively permits the second hand sale 
of copyright goods. In the context of physical goods, resale is generally not an 
infringement in Australia; but without a clear right, the resale of digital goods will be an 
infringement of Australian copyright law. This article considers the public policy 
considerations around establishing a digital secondary market. It first provides a review 
of recent US and EU cases that reflect upon the legality of secondary digital markets, 
with reference to the history and development of the first sale doctrine and the principle 
of exhaustion. This article then reviews the potential impact of secondary markets on 
consumers’ access to copyright goods. It is proposed that, given the indeterminacy of 
economic analyses in this context, careful consideration should be given to the social 
and personal impacts of restrictions on alienation of digital goods, compared to their 
physical equivalents. It is suggested there is good reason to think enabling digital 
secondary markets could improve access to content and foster the innate human 
desire to share and gift. Finally, this article considers the potential legal framework that 
would support and enable digital secondary markets to exist under Australian law.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Second hand markets have long been a part of the consumer economy. The benefits 
of such secondary markets are often overlooked or forgotten. This is due (in part), to 
the longstanding, uncontested nature of secondary markets. Prior to the digital era, 
secondary sale was a definite option for consumers. The digital era challenges the 
legality of secondary markets with respect to the resale of digital content. A primary 
example of this is in the university textbook market. E-text books are becoming 
increasingly prevalent in universities, with many institutions encouraging the use of e-
texts in lieu of physical books.1   Whilst e-texts may decrease the overall cost of 
textbooks for students, the restriction on the mode of distribution of learning tools 
places limitations on both the accessibility and price of the content.2 The concern is 
not the use of an e-text in and of itself, but the exclusive use of an e-text that is 
unavailable in any other format. Traditionally, the university textbook market provided 
two options for students: the new and full price copy of the textbook, for students who 
could or wanted to purchase the brand new copy at the premium price, or the second 
hand version acquired via a secondary market.  E-texts exemplify the current issues 
with the secondary sale of digital content; unlike physical texts, e-texts cannot be 
transferred from user to user, as they are restricted by licences and any resale (which 
may necessitate the making of a copy) may give rise to copyright infringement. 
Currently in Australia there is no law expressly allowing for the transfer or sale of digital 
content.   
 
In February 2014, the Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’) released a report 
entitled, ‘Australian Copyright and the Digital Economy’.3 The report made several 
recommendations for future reform of Australian copyright law, including the adoption 
of an Australian fair use exception. The scope of the report was, however, limited by 
the terms of reference and as a result other significant gaps in Australian copyright law 
were not specifically addressed; notably, secondary sale in a digital market. 
The secondary sale of digital content is an important issue affecting copyright holders 
and consumers alike. To date, the Australian government has taken an unhurried 
                                                        
* University Copyright Officer, Queensland University of Technology, LLB, BA, LLM. Many thanks to Nic 
Suzor and the anonymous reviewer for comments and suggestions on the article.    
1 See Giacomini C, et al, Exploring eTextbooks at the University of Washington: What We Learned and 
What is Next (2013) UW Information Technology, https://www.washington.edu/itconnect/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/UWeTextCampusReport.pdf.  
2 Giacomini, n 1, ‘the future of textbooks and course readings will be digital’.  
3 Australian Law Reform Commission, Copyright and the Digital Economy, Report No 122 (November 
2013) (ALRC Final Report). 
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approach with respect to addressing the gaps in copyright law and technological 
advancements.4 The current legal framework has placed Australia’s copyright law in a 
stagnant position when compared with other jurisdictions.5 Any form of secondary sale 
of digital content within Australia is almost certainly prohibited under the current laws, 
as there are no exceptions expressly providing for the secondary sale of digital content. 
 
The shift into the digital era challenges the traditional operation of secondary markets 
in our global economy. Whilst Australia is yet to formally consider such challenges, 
other jurisdictions including the United States (‘US’) and the European Union (‘EU’) 
have acknowledged the significance and complexity of the secondary sale of digital 
content. Unlike Australia, these jurisdictions have copyright law that expressly allows 
for traditional secondary sale. In the US, secondary markets for non-digital material 
are permitted by virtue of the established first sale doctrine.  Second hand record and 
bookstores may legally resell copyright material on the basis that the copyright holder’s 
exclusive right to control the distribution of that copy has been exhausted once it has 
been sold to the purchaser.6  This doctrine essentially sets out the ‘scope of the 
distribution right’ for owners of copyright work, placing a limitation on the exclusive 
rights of a copyright holder with respect to the distribution of the works after their first 
sale.7 Despite the secondary sale law in the US, the position with respect to digital 
secondary sale remains uncertain. In comparison, the EU principle of exhaustion is 
broader than the first sale doctrine, and essentially, exhausts the copyright holder’s 
exclusive rights upon the sale of the work. 8  
 
The resale of digital content in Australia is presently restricted by legislation, 
specifically, the absence of an express provision providing for digital resale to occur. 
Consequently, copyright holders are essentially able to claim control over the 
distribution of digital content long after its initial purchase by the consumer, and 
consumers are prohibited from selling, sharing or giving away their copy as they might 
otherwise be permitted to do with a hard copy. This article argues that in order for 
Australia to effectively balance the rights of copyright holders with those of consumers, 
                                                        
4 See ALRC Final Report, n 3, the recommendation to implement new legislation was made over 18 
months ago, however to date legislation has not been passed.  
5Suzor N, Google Books wins ‘fair use’ but Australian copyright lags, (November 2013), The Conversation, 
https://theconversation.com/google-books-wins-fair-use-but-australian-copyright-lags-20351.  
6 17 USC §109(a). 
7 US Department of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force, ‘White Paper on Remixes, First Sale, and 
Statutory Damages’ Copyright Policy, Creativity, and Innovation in the Digital Economy, January 2016, 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/copyrightwhitepaper.pdf  
8 EU Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society; Directive 2009/224/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 
on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, Art 4(2), 2009 OJ (L111/16).  
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a secondary market for the resale of digital content should be considered. Further, an 
investigation into the potential legal framework required to support such a digital 
secondary market should be undertaken.  
 
Part I of this article considers the historical development of the first sale doctrine in the 
US with particular reference to the Court’s reasoning in the leading case of Capitol 
Records, LCC v ReDigi Inc, (‘Capitol Records’).9 In this case, the Court found that the 
doctrine did not apply to the resale of digital content. The US legal position therefore 
provides one potential reference point for the development of Australian law.  
 
Part II of this article analyses the recent EU decision of UsedSoft Gmbh v Oracle 
International Corporation (‘UsedSoft’) with particular reference to the Court’s treatment 
of licensing agreements.10 In UsedSoft, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) held that the digital download of software from the manufacturer’s website 
coupled with the transfer of the software licence was a legal sale, and as such, the 
principle of exhaustion applied to the transaction. 11  The decision highlighted the 
CJEU’s openness and receptiveness to applying traditional principles to new 
technology.  As such, it provides important commentary for other jurisdictions to 
consider when addressing first sale, exhaustion and technology, and relevantly, 
provides some guidance for Australia to follow when developing a framework that 
permits secondary digital sale.  
 
Part III of this article considers the benefits of a secondary market for the resale of 
digital content by observing fundamental economic and social considerations. Firstly, 
the concerns associated with profit maximising strategies are considered with respect 
to market control and the impact this may have on consumer rights and access to 
copyright material. This access will be discussed with respect to economic access and 
the inherent ‘dead weight loss’ found in copyright and the limitations on distribution.12 
This article suggests that the profit maximising strategies of rights holders may not 
yield optimal outcomes and that a secondary market may expand access to copyright 
material to remedy this. Whilst the secondary market may assist in this, ultimately, 
there is no definite answer as to what the optimal economic balance might be. In the 
                                                        
9 Capitol Records, LLC v ReDigi, Inc, No 12-95, 2013 WL 1286134 (SDNY Mar 30, 2013).  
10 UsedSoft Gmbh v Oracle International Corporation C-128/11 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 611CJ0128 
(July 3 2012).   
11 UsedSoft Gmbh v Oracle International Corporation C-128/11 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 611CJ0128 
(July 3 2012).   
12 See Sloman J, et al, Economics (8th ed, Pearson Education Limited, Harlow, England, 2012), p 171.  
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absence of a determinable answer, this section turns to a discussion of human 
flourishing to assess the social value of a secondary market. A secondary market 
encourages human flourishing through the sharing and giving of content. The innate 
human desire to share through the giving of content is explored by considering the 
correlation between the concepts of endowment effect, loss aversion, attachment and 
sharing between persons.13 This article suggests that giving and sharing content is 
fundamental to human flourishing. Following from this, this Part concludes that 
restricting the sharing and giving of content may have significant negative implications 
on the underlying objectives of copyright. 
 
Part IV of this article addresses the current legal position in Australia and the absence 
of an express doctrine of first sale or exhaustion. This section builds on the assumption 
established in Part III, that secondary sale has overriding public policy benefits. This 
Part considers the possible framework for law reform including two potential legal 
frameworks: a common law doctrine and a specific statutory provision on a national 
level pertaining to the resale of digital content. This Part concludes that the option most 
consistent with Australia’s current copyright regime would be the implementation of a 
fair dealing exception expressly allowing for the resale or transfer of digital content. It 
is recommended that the Australian Government should conduct a review into digital 
first sale with a view to investigating the viability of incorporating a new fair dealing 
exception permitting digital resale. 
 
This article argues that a market for the resale of digital content may restore balance 
to the interests of copyright holders and consumers, by ensuring that content is 
accessible, cost efficient and unrestricted by format.  In a technologically driven era, 
access to copyright material is an important aspect of encouraging innovation.14 In the 
absence of the ability to establish a legal secondary market for digital content, the 
current copyright laws weigh in favour of copyright holders and undermine significant 
policy concerns with respect to access, distribution of content and social norms.  
  
                                                        
13 See Kahneman D, et al, “Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias” 
(1991) 5(1) Journal of Economic Perspectives 193; Kahneman D, et at, “The Endowment Effect: Evidence 
of Losses Valued More Than Gains” in The Handbook of Experimental Economics Results (Vol 1, Elsevier 
BV, 2008); Shu S and Peck J, “Psychological ownership and affective reaction: Emotional attachment, 
process variables and the endowment effect” (2011) 21 Journal of Consumer Psychology 439.  
14 Perzanowski A and Schultz J, “Copyright Exhaustion and Personal Use Dilemma”, (2012) 96 Minn L 
Rev 2067, 2114.  
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PART I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE DOCTRINE OF FIRST SALE 
 
The first sale doctrine or principle of exhaustion (as it is known in the EU) provides that 
the exclusive rights of the copyright holder are extinguished upon first sale of the 
copyright material.15 Whilst the specifics of the doctrine and principle vary between 
jurisdictions, the application remains largely the same. 16 On an international level 
there is no instrument that outlines the correct treatment or application of the doctrine.17   
 
In the US, the first sale doctrine was first recognised in the 1908 Supreme Court 
watershed case of Bobbs-Merrill Co v Straus,18 the facts of which centred around 
retailer giant Macy’s refusal to sell books at a price set by the copyright holder.19 This 
case found there was a limitation to a copyright holder’s exclusive rights in that once 
the copy of the material was sold, the copyright holder’s control over the copy ceased.20  
The case conclusively established that the right holder did not have the authority to 
control future sales. 21    
 
This decision was later codified in §109(a) of the current Copyright Act 1976 (US).22 
Judicial interpretation of the doctrine has gained momentum in recent years, with 
courts considering a number of cases which have ultimately broadened the scope of 
the doctrine’s application. In the recent case of Kirtsaeng v John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 
the US Supreme Court held that the first sale doctrine applied to the resale of copyright 
material where (in that case) the first sale occurred in Thailand and was on-sold in the 
US.23 This case clarified the scope of the doctrine specifically with respect to foreign 
first sale. The Court held that the doctrine extinguished the copyright holder’s ability to 
control the future sale of the copyright material.24 Whilst the traditional interpretation of 
the doctrine was limited to cases involving physical material, the US courts did not fully 
consider its application with respect to digital content, until the decision in Capitol 
Records.  
                                                        
15 Bobbs-Merrill Co v Straus 210 US 339, (1908). 
16 See Perzanowski A and Schultz J, “Digital Exhaustion” (2011) 58 UCLA Law Review, 889, for a 
discussion on the difference between exhaustion and the doctrine of first sale.  
17 Rub G, “Rebalancing Copyright Exhaustion” (2015) 64 Emory Law Journal 741, p 752; See Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, opened for signature 15 April 1994, Art 6, ATS 
38 (entered into force on 1 January 1995). 
18 Bobbs-Merrill Co v Straus 210 US 339, (1908).  
19 Bobbs-Merrill Co v Straus 210 US 339, (1908). 
20 Bobbs-Merrill Co v Straus 210 US 339, (1908) pp 350-351. 
21 Bobbs-Merrill Co v Straus 210 US 339, (1908). 
22 17 USC §109(a). 
23 Kirtsaeng v John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 133 S Ct 1351 (2013).  
24 Kirtsaeng v John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 133 S Ct 1351 (2013); Omega SA v Costco Wholesale Corp, 2015 
US App LEXIS 830 (9th Cir Cal Jan 20, 2015).  
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In October 2011, ReDigi Inc, (‘ReDigi’), a start-up technology company from Boston 
Massachusetts, launched the world’s first online marketplace for used digital music,25 
which has since been accused of opening up a ‘Pandora’s box’.26 Much like Napster 
in 1999, ReDigi’s marketplace challenged the established and rigid concepts of 
copyright law.27 Shortly after its initial release, record company heavyweight Capitol 
Records commenced legal action against ReDigi alleging multiple violations of the 
Copyright Act 1976 (US), including copyright infringement, contributory copyright 
infringement, vicarious copyright infringement and inducement of copyright 
infringement.28 The basis of the claims were that ReDigi provided a platform which 
facilitated, induced and directly infringed copyright. 29  ReDigi opposed the action, 
submitting that the US first sale doctrine supported its business model.30 
 
In a media release dated October 11 2011, founder and CEO of ReDigi John 
Ossenmacher stated his belief that ‘…giving digital goods resale value will open ‘…a 
new realm’ of possibility in the digital era’.31 He further argued that ReDigi’s technology 
signified ‘an important transition in the digital space, beyond the scope of what anyone 
thought was possible’.32 ReDigi offered consumers the ability to buy, sell and stream 
digital content. To participate on ReDigi’s platform, a user was required to download 
ReDigi’s ‘Media Manager’ application and select ‘eligible digital music’ files to be 
transferred from the user’s computer to the ReDigi ‘Cloud Locker’.33 An eligible music 
file was one that was either purchased from another ReDigi user or purchased from 
iTunes.  ReDigi claimed that this was an ‘instantaneous transfer’, as, instead of copying 
the file to another location the file was transferred from the user’s computer ‘packet by 
                                                        
25 ReDigi, ReDigi, The World’s First Online Marketplace For Used Digital Music Set to Launch (October 
11 2011), http://newsroom.redigi.com/redigi-the-worlds-first-online-marketplace-for-used-digital-music-
set-to-launch/; Yahoo! Finance, Business Wire, ReDigi™, The World's First Online Marketplace For USED 
Digital Music Set to Launch October 13th, 2011 (October 11 2011) http://finance.yahoo.com/news/ReDigi-
The-Worlds-First-bw-3520951165.html.  
26 Transcript of Oral Argument Capitol Records, LLC v ReDigi, Inc, No 12-95 2013 WL 1286134 (SDNY 
Mar 30, 2013), p 6. 
27 A&M Records, Inc v Napster, Inc, 239 F3d 1004 (2001). The landmark case that determined that the 
file sharing, peer-to-peer network could be held liable for infringement. 
28 See Complaint, ReDigi, No 12-95; 17 USC.  
https://cases.justia.com/federal/districtcourts/newyork/nysdce/1:2012cv00095/390216/1/0.pdf?ts=13770
19986.    
29 Complaint, ReDigi, n 28.  
30 17 USC §109(a). 
31 Business Wire, n 25.  
32 Business Wire, n 25. 
33 See Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts 12 CIV 0095, No 51, 2 - 3 [8-13], 
https://cases.justia.com/federal/districtcourts/newyork/nysdce/1:2012cv00095/390216/56/0.pdf?ts=1376
361850. 
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packet’ to the Cloud Locker. 34 Once in the Cloud Locker, the user could store, stream, 
or sell the file.35 Once sold, the original user would no longer have access to the file as 
access was transferred to the purchaser, who might choose to stream, download, or 
sell the file. Crucially, after a sale, the ‘Media Manager’ continually checked on the 
user’s computer to ensure that the user did not retain music that was sold or uploaded 
for sale.36  The technicalities of the transfer to the Cloud Locker and as between 
purchaser and seller are important, as the primary point of contention was whether the 
files were ‘transferred’ or technically ‘reproduced’.  
 
The copyright infringement allegations were on the basis that ReDigi’s ‘transfer’ of the 
file from a user’s device to the cloud also constituted an unauthorised reproduction of 
the file. Capitol alleged that this constituted infringement of the exclusive right to ‘do 
and to authorize’ the reproduction of ‘the copyrighted work in copies or 
phonorecords’.37 It was argued that the point in which the music file was reassembled 
in the Cloud Locker, or ‘fixed into a new material object’, was the point of 
reproduction.38  
 
ReDigi argued there was no reproduction on the basis that their technology effectively 
‘migrated’ the file from the user’s device to the Cloud Locker but did not copy it.39 The 
file was transferred in small fragments, with one fragment at a time transferred from 
the users computer to the Cloud Locker. There was only ever one copy of the fragment 
in existence at any one time. The Court however, held that, having regard to the laws 
of physics, ‘it is simply impossible that the same material object can be transferred 
over the internet...’40 and that, accordingly, such a transfer physically requires a copy 
to be made (by the process of reassembling the individual packets) at the file’s 
                                                        
34  PR Newswire, ReDigi Press Release, ReDigi, Inc. Awarded Significant US Patent (2014), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/redigi-inc-awarded-significant-us-patent-242554041.html; 
ReDigi, ‘ReDigi, Inc. Awarded Significant U.S. Patent, ReDigi Inc.’ (Jan. 29, 2014),  
http://newsroom.redigi.com/redigi-inc-awarded-significant-u-s-patent/.  
Capitol Records, LLC v ReDigi, Inc, No 12-95, 2013 WL 1286134 (SDNY Mar 30, 2013) at 2.  
35 Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts, n 33.  
36 See Capitol Records, LLC v ReDigi, Inc, No 12-95, 2013 WL 1286134 (SDNY Mar 30, 2013), 2. If the 
Media Manager detects a copy on the users device they will be prompted to delete this copy. Failure to 
comply would result in an account suspension.  
37 17 UCS §106(1).  
38 Soma J and Kugler M, “Why Rent When You Can Own? How ReDigi, Apple, and Amazon Will use the 
Cloud and the Digital First Sale Doctrine to Resell Music, e-books, Games, and Movies” (2014) 15(3) NC 
JL & Tech 425. 
39 Capitol Records, LLC v ReDigi, Inc, No 12-95, 2013 WL 1286134 (SDNY Mar 30, 2013), 2 [3]. 
40 Capitol Records, LLC v ReDigi, Inc, No 12-95, 2013 WL 1286134 (SDNY Mar 30, 2013), 6 [4] citing 
London- Sire Records, Inc v John Doe 1 542 F. Supp 2d 153 (D. Mass 2008).  
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destination. The mere fact that only one copy was in existence did not mean that the 
original file was not reproduced.41  
 
The Court therefore determined that ReDigi was ‘distributing reproductions’ of the 
copyright work and further, that the first sale doctrine did not apply. 42  It was held that 
the transfer process occurring in the ReDigi technology was one, which was ‘plainly 
within the sort of transaction that §106(3) was intended to reach [and] fit[s] within the 
definition of ‘distribution’ of a phonorecord’.43 The Court ultimately granted Capitol’s 
motion with respect to claims for infringement of its distribution, reproduction rights and 
further noted that issues regarding development of the law (to reflect technological 
change) were matters to be deferred to Congress for determination.44  
 
The Capitol Records case illustrates the significant disjunction between law and 
innovation that may arise in the copyright arena. This case exemplifies a real shift in 
practical terms from physical copyright material to digital copyright material and 
outlines the complexities involved with technology especially with respect to attempts 
at circumventing current physical copyright laws to allow for digital uses and 
distribution. The US position is significant for Australia as it illustrates the complexities 
associated with the application of traditional legal doctrines, developed in the context 
of non-digital material, to new technology. Part II of this article considers the EU 
principle of exhaustion in the context of a secondary market for resale of digital content, 
which provides a different standpoint for other jurisdictions to consider when 
determining cases including new technology and traditional models of law. 
PART II. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION 
 
The EU has a recognised principle of exhaustion, which has a similar application to 
the US first sale doctrine.45 As required by the relevant EU directives, Member States 
of the EU have variously codified the principles of exhaustion in their respective 
                                                        
41 Capitol Records, LLC v ReDigi, Inc, No 12-95, 2013 WL 1286134 (SDNY Mar 30, 2013), 2 [5].  
42 Capitol Records, LLC v ReDigi, Inc, No 12-95, 2013 WL 1286134 (SDNY Mar 30, 2013), 12 [1].  
43Capitol Records, LLC v ReDigi, Inc, No 12-95, 2013 WL 1286134 (SDNY Mar 30, 2013), 8, His Honour 
Judge Sullivan citing London-Sire, 542 F Supp 2d 153 at 173-74. 
44Capitol Records, LLC v ReDigi, Inc, No 12-95, 2013 WL 1286134 (SDNY Mar 30, 2013), ReDigi has 
since commenced plans to launch a 2.0 version of the platform which may avoid the legal implications 
that were found in the decision of Capitol Records. This new version is currently undergoing beta testing, 
See ReDigi, ReDigi, Inc Awarded Significant US Patent, ReDigi Inc (Jan 29, 2014) 
http://newsroom.redigi.com/redigi-inc-awarded-significant-u-s-patent/; US Patent No 8,627,500 B2 (filed 
Dec 31, 2010). 
45 EU Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society; Directive 2009/224/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 
on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, Art 4(2), 2009 OJ (L111/16). 
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copyright acts.46 The EU principle of exhaustion is established by Article 4 of the 
Information Society Directive (‘Info Soc Directive’), which states that: 
 
The distribution right shall not be exhausted within the Community in respect of 
the original or copies of the work, except where the first sale or other transfer of 
ownership in the Community of that object is made by the right holder or with his 
consent.47    
The EU exhaustion principle is also separately incorporated in the EU Software 
Directive (‘Software Directive’).48 Articles 2 and 4 of the Software Directive specifically 
refer to the application of the principle of exhaustion and the rights of a copyright 
holder.49  
 
The application of the EU principle of exhaustion to digital material was tested by the 
CJEU in the seminal case of UsedSoft.50  In UsedSoft the Court was asked to consider 
the principle of exhaustion with respect to the resale of ‘used’ software in digital form.51 
The defendant to the action was a German start-up company, which resold used 
software originally distributed by a US company, Oracle. UsedSoft purchased second 
hand ‘current’ and already activated software licence keys. Consumers purchased 
these license keys from UsedSoft and then downloaded the requisite software from 
the original distribution company (Oracle) thus allowing them to use the software in its 
entirety.52 Oracle initiated proceedings against UsedSoft in Germany and the case was 
referred to the CJEU for determination. In particular, the Court was asked to consider 
whether a ‘resale’ such as this was permitted and if UsedSoft had infringed Oracle’s 
copyright. In reaching their decision, the CJEU considered the key questions of what 
amounts to a lawful acquisition of the software, whether there was a license preventing 
                                                        
46 The United Kingdom has Exhaustion in the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 ss 16(1)(b), 18(1) 
and 18(2) 18(3)(a). 
47 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Article 4(2).  
48 Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal 
protection of computer programs, Articles 2, 4.  
49 Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal 
protection of computer programs, Arts 2, 4.  
50 UsedSoft Gmbh v Oracle International Corporation C-128/11 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 611CJ0128 
(July 3 2012).   
51 UsedSoft Gmbh v Oracle International Corporation C-128/11 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 611CJ0128 
(July 3 2012).   
52 UsedSoft Gmbh v Oracle International Corporation C-128/11 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 611CJ0128 
(July 3 2012), at 20 and 24.  
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its resale, and further, whether the copyright in such lawfully acquired software was 
exhausted by the ‘resale’.53 
 
The CJEU held that the lawful acquisition of software occurs at the point that the 
software is downloaded onto the user’s computer.54 In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court confirmed that the exclusive rights of a copyright holder were exhausted once 
the software had been sold.55 Furthermore, the Court held that the EU principle of 
exhaustion precludes the right holder from preventing a resale or distribution of the 
software, and therefore the user is not prevented from reselling the software.56 It was 
determined that there was no further authorisation required by the copyright holder so 
long as the original download was authorised. In this instance the software was clearly 
available on Oracle’s website for download.57  
 
UsedSoft therefore set a new precedent with respect to digital resale. Importantly, 
despite the absence of an accepted international principle of exhaustion, the CJEU 
recognised the EU principle of exhaustion on the basis that it ‘forms part of the system 
that promotes trade and economic integration in a single market’.58 The CJEU affirmed 
the application of the principle of exhaustion to digital material and, by so doing, ‘fuelled 
a huge debate’ in the legal, professional and academic sectors with respect to the 
secondary market for the resale of digital content.59  
 
The position established in UsedSoft is effectively that the principle of exhaustion is 
not limited to physical goods in the EU, which lies in stark contrast to the US position 
established in Capitol Records and, as explained further below, the position in 
Australia. Whilst the two cases involve different facts, the point in which the courts 
consider the exclusive rights of the right holder to be exhausted (or not), provides 
important commentary for other jurisdictions to contemplate when applying current law 
                                                        
53UsedSoft Gmbh v Oracle International Corporation C-128/11 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 611CJ0128 
(July 3 2012) at 30- 34.  
54UsedSoft Gmbh v Oracle International Corporation C-128/11 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 611CJ0128 
(July 3 2012), at 59.  
55UsedSoft Gmbh v Oracle International Corporation C-128/11 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 611CJ0128 
(July 3 2012), at 72.  
56UsedSoft Gmbh v Oracle International Corporation C-128/11 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 611CJ0128 
(July 3 2012).   
57UsedSoft Gmbh v Oracle International Corporation C-128/11 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 611CJ0128 
(July 3 2012), at 21. ‘The customer downloads a copy of the software directly to his computer from Oracle’s 
website’. 
58 Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal 
protection of computer programs, Art 4(2); Morris, S “Beyond Trade: Global Digital Exhaustion in 
International Economic Regulation” (2014) 36(1) Campbell L Rev 107, p 118. 
59 Morris, n 58, p 120.  
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to new technology. Both the US and EU positions should be looked to for guidance 
when addressing digital resale in Australia. The Australian position is explained and 
analysed in Part IV of this article. The following Part of this article, however, discusses 
the underlying rationales for supporting a secondary market for digital content, 
including: market control and access to content and the fundamental importance of 
sharing and giving.  
PART III.  THE MARKET FOR RESALE – POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Copyright law aims to balance public access to copyright works with incentives for 
copyright holders. In traditional markets, this balance was maintained, in part by a 
thriving secondary market. In a digital world, we do not have a permissive secondary 
market and as such, copyright may be somewhat out of balance. This imbalance is 
discussed in two parts. Firstly, the basic economic principles are reviewed discussing 
the profit maximising strategies of right holders and the potential for imperfect price 
discrimination and market power to affects consumers access to copyright work. This 
discussion considers copyright infringement and examples of market power within the 
university textbook market and music industry. It is concluded that we do not have 
enough evidence to determine whether such price maximisation strategies are 
negatively affecting consumer welfare. Following on from this, and in the absence of a 
determinate answer, this article suggests that consideration should be given to non-
economic theories such as human flourishing and the impact a secondary market could 
have on access, sharing and giving of digital content. This article suggests that a 
secondary market may assist in rebalancing the competing interests.    
 
A. Access to Copyright Work, Market Power and Copyright Infringement   
Copyright law is a legislative monopoly that effectively allows copyright holders to 
control the market for distribution and, to an extent, the price of content.60 The efficient 
price of a good is the cost of distribution, and in terms of information and digital content, 
this cost is ‘marginal to zero’.61 Right holders, however, may charge more than the 
efficient price, which leads to a ‘dead weight loss’; that is, the significant number of 
                                                        
60 Boyle J, “Cruel, Mean or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual 
Property” (2000) 53(6) Vanderbilt Law Review 2007.   
61 Boyle, n 60, p 2013. 
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consumers who cannot afford (or will not pay) the ‘monopoly price’ set by the right 
holder.62  This in turn creates a net ‘welfare loss’. 63 
 
A primary concern with the economics of copyright is that the law does not account for 
the consumers who cannot afford (or will not) pay the monopoly price. The right 
holders’ tendency towards maximising their profits may disproportionately affect 
consumers who are in a low socio-economic bracket and who cannot afford this price. 
As such, monopoly pricing may impact the objectives of copyright law with respect to 
restricting the access to content for a portion of the community. This limitation on 
access may, in addition, negatively affect the creation of new copyright material. In 
circumstances where consumers have limited choice or the mode of distribution is 
restricted, copyright law assists owners in acquiring a ‘disproportionate amount of 
market power’.64 To redress this, this article suggests that a secondary market may 
assist in rebalancing the rights of copyright holders with those of consumers by 
providing greater access to content for numbers of consumers.  
 
The digital era may exacerbate the dead weight loss associated with copyright 
protection. In terms of digital content - books, games, software, movies and music - 
copyright material is bought and sold in imperfectly competitive markets with minimal 
active price discrimination. In today’s economy, access to digital content is subject to 
markets in which copyright holders hold a degree of market power. In most cases, the 
purchase of digital content is limited to specific outlets such as iTunes or Amazon; and 
content is ‘tethered’ to a device.65 In the absence of any secondary market, ‘there is 
neither downward pressure on price nor an unlicensed rental market’. 66  The 
consumers are not afforded the benefits associated with a perfectly competitive 
market, especially lower prices; and importantly, the consumer’s right to access 
material is restricted as right holders have more power to control digital distribution of 
content.  
                                                        
62 See Sloman n, 12 p 171, A price that is set by the monopoly, the copyright holder, Boyle, n 60, p 2013. 
‘The monopolist will receive the greatest return by pricing at a level that excludes a part of the market that 
is willing to pay above marginal cost…’ 
63 See Posner, R. "Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation," 21 Stanford Law Review 548 (1968), 552 for an 
explanation of monopoly pricing and welfare loss in copyright; Robinson, J. The Economics of Imperfect 
Competition (Macmillan, London, 1933).  
64  Koch J, ACSFA College Textbook Cost Study Response to Study Plan Proposal (2006), 
https://www.wvhepc.org/commission/Textbooks%20Study/ACSFA%20College%20Textbook%20Cost%
20Study%20Plan%20Proposal.pdf; Koch J, An Economic Analysis of Textbook Pricing and Textbook 
Markets (2006), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED497025.pdf. 
65 See Amazon Music Terms of Use 
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201380010; Perzanowski and Schultz, n 
16, p 905. 
66 Perzanowski and Schultz, n 16, p 904. 
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A secondary market may act as a form of additional competition to the primary market. 
In this instance the owner’s market power would still exist, as the secondary market 
would only carry a portion of the available content (whatever was made available on a 
second hand basis). The competition would be limited but may still exert enough 
downward pressure on the primary market to either encourage price discrimination 
(where this is possible), or otherwise simply provide consumers with the benefit of 
purchasing (second hand) content at a cost efficient price. The copyright holder would 
receive no further revenue from the content, exactly as in any traditional second hand 
market. This allows the right holder to continue to charge prices above marginal costs, 
while facilitating access to content that would otherwise not be available to some 
consumers. Whilst effective price discrimination occurs in some markets, it is often 
time based with content decreasing in price over a period of time. This method can be 
effective in some instances, however with digital content, time based price 
discrimination may not be successful.  
 
A secondary market may also assist in decreasing online copyright infringement, which 
may in turn support the primary market. If digital goods are given secondary value, 
consumers may be more inclined to purchase content legitimately as they have an 
alternate avenue to purchase goods at a more affordable price. In terms of consumer 
welfare, consumers would have the option of purchasing the premium priced good, 
knowing it had secondary value, or alternately purchasing the second hand good 
(when available in the secondary market). Copyright infringement occurs, (in part) as 
a result of the ‘lack of accessibility and high prices’ of content coupled with ‘unmet 
consumer demand’, which may encourage consumers to engage in copyright 
infringement.67 The sharing economy may be legitimised through the creation of a 
secondary market offering content at a lower price. Such a market would provide for 
the personal use of digital content and include sharing, giving and reselling digital 
copyright material. Recognition of the interests and beliefs of consumers may improve 
‘copyright law’s legitimacy’ as a whole and the rates of online copyright infringement 
may potentially decrease.68 A secondary market for digital content would not eradicate 
online copyright infringement, but it may alleviate some of the issues with respect to 
both pricing and access. If reliance is placed on the idea that consumers want to 
                                                        
67 Dootson P and Suzor N, “The Game of Clones and the Australia Tax: Divergent Views about Copyright 
Business Models and the Willingness of Australian Consumers to Infringe” (2015) 38(1) UNSW Law 
Journal 206, p 208.   
68 Perzanowski and Schultz, n 14, p 2080.  
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purchase content legally, by providing an avenue to purchase content that is cost 
efficient, the rates of online copyright infringement may accordingly decrease.69  
 
In the absence of a digital secondary market, the increase in use of e-books, digital 
music and movies may create significant issues with respect to access to content. A 
form of ‘positive action’ such a secondary market should be explored to ensure that 
digital markets do not further entrench the market power of copyright holders.70 These 
concerns regarding access to copyright work and market control are observed in the 
university textbook market. Firstly textbook publishers (the right holders) have the 
ability to raise the prices of textbooks with few repercussions to the loss of sales or 
competition. Secondly, with the increase in the use of e-textbooks, the market for 
distribution is restricted to digital, and as such consumers are provided limited options 
to access the content.  Textbook publishers, and e-textbook publishers in particular, 
have a higher degree of market control in comparison to other markets. They have the 
power to choose what textbook is included in the curriculum, the ability to set the price 
of this text and can limit the access to the e-text for a set time such as the duration of 
the semester only. Such a ‘monopoly chokehold’ has significant repercussions on both 
consumers and competitive markets.71 A secondary market for resale of digital content 
may assist in addressing this monopoly by extending the access to content.  
 
Another example of market control effecting consumer access to material is the online 
music industry. Consumers purchase music legitimately through online music stores 
such iTunes or Amazon. The content that is purchased is tethered to their account and 
as such, non-transferable.72 Whilst the user can access the content on any device 
associated with their account, the restrictions placed on the content itself prevent a 
consumer from freely sharing, transferring or selling the content. The distributors in 
this sense have a high degree of market power, as there are no alternate legal modes 
of distribution to purchase the content. The fundamental concern in both the university 
textbook market and the online music industry is the limitation placed on access to 
copyright work for consumers in a digital environment.  
 
                                                        
69 Suzor N, “Free-riding, cooperation, and 'peaceful revolutions' in copyright” (2014) 28(1) Harvard Journal 
of Law and Technology 138, p 160; Belsky, L, et al, “Everything in Its Right Place, Social Cooperation and 
Artist Compensation” (2010) 17 Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev, 1, p 5. 
70 Adams W, “Public Policy in a Free Enterprise Economy”, in The Structure of American Industry (5th ed, 
Macmillan, New York, 1977) 482- 514, p 513. 
71 Minda G, “Monopoly Pricing on Campus: New York’s Textbook Access Act” (2008-2009) 29 Pace L 
Rev 523, p 526.  
72 In many cases the ‘purchase’ is only a license for certain uses. 
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There are other reasons a publisher or copyright holder may choose to limit or prevent 
access to copyright work. A system which supports a copyright holder having control 
over the distribution of their work, in the absence of some form of exhaustion risks 
conflicting ‘…with the delicate balance that copyright law has struck between copyright 
holders and the public’.73 The concern lays in the control of distribution. In instances 
where a book goes out of publication or a publisher for one reason or another decides 
to cease printing (and the book is not yet in the public domain), copies of this book 
may be available in libraries or second hand bookstores. If the book was only published 
digitally, and in the absence of a first sale doctrine, ‘a copyright owner’s decision to 
discontinue any further transmissions of the work could well be effective to deny all 
access to the work’. 74  This is especially relevant with respect to works which a 
copyright owner actively decides to ‘suppress’.75 Whilst there are a number of personal 
or political reasons a copyright owner may decide to ‘suppress’ a work, it is argued that 
once the material has previously been made available to the public, denial of this work 
is inconsistent with the objectives of copyright law.76 The secondary market would 
assist in ensuring that copyright material (despite the owners’ suppression) remains 
available to the public.77  
 
We do not have conclusive evidence that the price maximisation strategies of copyright 
holders are negatively affecting consumer welfare and consumer rights to access and 
use copyright work. The optimal economic balance is complex and potentially 
unknowable.78 The next section considers access to and use of copyright work, the 
theory human flourishing and the effect on sharing and giving of digital content.  
 
 
B. Social Considerations 
 
A key fundamental benefit of the secondary market is fostering the human desire to 
share and give. Copyright encourages human flourishing, the freedom to create, 
innovate and disseminate new work to the public. 79 A fundamental aspect of this 
                                                        
73 Serra, T, “Rebalancing at Resale: ReDigi, Royalties, and the Digital Secondary Market” (2013) 93 BU 
L Rev 1753, p 1779. 
74 Reece RA, “The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks”, (2003) 44(2) BC L Rev 577, p 630. 
75 Serra, n 73, p 1780. 
76 USC Art I, § 8, Clause 8; Serra, n 74, p 1780.   
77 Serra, n 73, p 1780.  
78 See Towse R et al. “The Economics of Copyright Law”, (2008) 5(1) Review of Economic Research on 
Copyright Issues, 1.  
79 Suzor, n 69 p 189, ‘Human flourishing requires that people have a minimum threshold of capability to 
exercise the freedoms required for a life of dignity and well-being’.  
  17 
flourishing is the desire to share. According to anthropological studies it is a ‘basic 
human motivation’ to share.80  The value of sharing for individuals is fundamental; 
people share to gain trust and friendship, to find common ground and it can act as a 
form of ‘social identification’.81  In the digital age, much of this sharing occurs through 
digital means: texting, social media platforms, peer-to-peer etc.  Digital sharing should 
not be considered less ‘human’ than the traditional forms of sharing.82 Digital sharing 
(as opposed to traditional sharing), is a response to the changes in technology and 
culture and should be afforded the same consideration as traditional forms of sharing, 
including freedom to share in ways not restricted by law. 
The current restraints on digital secondary sale may have negative effects on the 
human experience. In the absence of a legal principle of exhaustion, can a person 
share or give away their digital copy of a book or a favourite song? The answer 
according to the US Court in Capitol Records is no. In many instances, the law 
distinguishes the physical from the digital, but in the context of the issues explored in 
this article, this may have serious negative implications on giving and sharing. The 
sharing experience would be restricted by the mode of distribution. In effect, the law 
would operate, in these circumstances, to prevent the giving of gifts and sharing 
between persons.  
 
In some jurisdictions, and even to an extent in Australia, copyright law allows copies 
to be made for the purpose of personal use.83 The scope of personal use has been 
discussed by many scholars, some arguing that ‘its legal status remains unclear’.84 
Personal use has, in general, overriding benefits. It achieves copyright’s purpose of 
‘increased public access, preservation …’, helps to achieve ‘economic efficiency’ and 
encourages innovation. 85  The pertinent question is whether sharing, giving or 
bequeathing digital content is, or should be, classified as a personal use? This article 
contends that regardless of the physical or digital form of copyright products, 
consumers should be able to ‘fully utilize them for personal activities and then lawfully 
alienate them, just as they would with any other piece of personal property’.86  
 
                                                        
80 Tomasello M, Origins of Human Communication (MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2008) p 282.  
81 Tomasello, n 80.  
82 The New York Times Customer Insight Group, ‘The Psychology of Sharing: Why do people share 
online?’ p11, http://nytmarketing.whsites.net/mediakit/pos/.  
83 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).  
84 Perzanowski and Schultz, n 14, p 2069. 
85 Perzanowski and Schultz, n 14, p 2074. 
86 Perzanowski and Schultz, n 14.  
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For instance, a consumer may purchase a book on their Kindle. The book is enjoyable 
and the consumer wishes to share this with a friend. With a physical book there would 
be no issues with respect to lending the book to a friend. However, in the absence of 
lending a person an entire physical Kindle, the digital book cannot be shared. The 
consumer paid for the book, has enjoyed and grown an attachment to the story and 
would like to share this with another, however, the restrictions placed on the content 
itself and the concerns with transferring the book (digitally), prevent it from being 
shared.87 A law that unduly restricts a basic human interaction such as sharing is 
arguably unsuitable.  
 
The theory of emotional attachment discusses the bonds between people and 
objects.88 Attachment theory suggests that humans readily attach themselves with 
others, animals and objects.89 Throughout history humans have grown attachments to 
things, paintings, iconic structures, books and like cultural products. In many instances 
this attachment is exemplified when a person can share it with another. This is often 
found when a book is shared between friends, or a painting is given as a gift. The 
sentimental value that the first person holds in the object makes the gift or sharing so 
much more important on a basic human level.   
 
According to economic theory, ‘all behaviour can be explained by assuming that agents 
have stable, well-defined preferences and make rational choices consistent with those 
preferences...’.90 An anomaly of this economic theory is the endowment effect. The 
suggestion underlying this effect is that ‘people often demand more to give up an object 
than they would be willing to pay to acquire it…’.91 This reluctance to give up an object 
is a bi-product of ‘loss aversion’.92  
 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously commented on this principle stating that: 
                                                        
87 Amazon terms and condition expressly prohibit the transfer of the license for resale. See Amazon Music 
Terms of Use, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201380010. 
88 Hiebert P, A History of Humans Loving Inanimate Objects (2014), http://www.psmag.com/health-and-
behavior/history-humans-loving-inanimate-objects-75192.  
89 See Winnicott DW, “The Use of an Object” (1969) 50 International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 711. 
Winnicott outlines the process of object-relating in infants. ‘In object-relating the subject allows certain 
alterations in the self to take place, of a kind that has caused us to invent the term ‘cathexis’. The object 
has become meaningful’.  
90 Kahneman, n 13, p 193.  
91 Kahneman, n 13, p 194 citing Thaler, R, “Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice”, (1980) 1 
Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 39.  
92 Reb J, and Connolly T, “Possession, feelings of ownership and the endowment effect” (2007) 2(2) 
Judgment and Decision Making 107, p107; See Kahneman n, 13. 
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It is in the nature of a man’s mind. A thing which you enjoyed and used as your 
own for a long time, whether property or opinion, takes root in your being and 
cannot be torn away without your resenting the act…’.93  
 
The aversion to losing the valued item is a paramount consideration for people. Recent 
psychological studies propose that emotional attachment to objects can explain a 
majority of the ‘endowment effect findings’.94 The attachment of ownership, coupled 
with the associated emotional reaction, underlies the endowment effect.95  
 
These theories interplay with the human desire to share. Whether this loss aversion 
(both economic and emotional) could be mitigated when the subject item is given to 
another person of significance is unknown. It is proposed that the aversion to losing 
an item may be lessened through the act of giving or sharing as the individual would 
gain the human satisfaction of giving something of importance to them to another a 
person with whom they have a bond. This proposition suggests that the human desire 
to share and give objects (that they have endowed as important) may override the 
economic desire to make rational, economically efficient choices. Whether such a 
correlation between loss aversion and sharing exists should be further investigated 
and considered when discussing the importance of sharing content, both physical and 
digital.  
 
Sharing is often used as a means to express emotion, by using another’s work as a 
way to express particular feelings to the recipient.96 Copying has been considered a 
form of ‘self-expression’, in using another’s words, music or pictures to ‘explain and 
define beliefs and thoughts’. 97 The very sharing of the work ‘is materially more valuable 
to readers than the original that they can’t get, that costs too much, or that they don’t 
know about . . . .’.98 In essence being able to give or share with another, a piece of 
copyright work that holds sentimental value is an essential part of human interaction. 
The sentimental value of content is not limited to physical objects and may exist in 
digital content.  
 
                                                        
93 Holmes OW, “Dedication 1897 The Path of the Law” (1897) 45 BU L Rev 24, p 41. 
94 Shu, n 13, 439; Ariely D, et al, “When do losses loom larger than gains?” (2005) 42 Journal of Marketing 
Research, 134. 
95 Shu, n 13, pp 439 - 440.  
96 Tushnet R, “Copy this Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It” 
(2004) 114 Yale Law Journal 535, p 566. 
97 Tushnet, n 96.  
98 Volokh E, “Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, 
and Bartnicki” (2003) 40 Houston Law Review 697.  
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In today’s society consumers have the option to stream content as opposed to buying 
it. Consider applications such as Spotify, Netflix and YouTube; consumers either 
receive the service for free or they pay a monthly fee.99 But what about the consumer 
who feels emotionally attached to a particular song or movie? In some instances 
consumers may purchaser their own copy, either digitally or physically. They may even 
want to share this copy or give it to a friend. With respect to digital content, the law 
currently does not allow the latter to occur.  
 
Another example of the restrictions on digital content and human flourishing can be 
examined when discussing a persons’ will.  A growing concern in the digital era is how 
can we bequeath personal objects of significance that are in digital form? One of the 
largest digital music collections in the world consists of approximately 172,150 
tracks.100 Without the ability to transfer or sell these tracks, the collection will not be 
able to be bequeathed. Any physical collections of music can easily be distributed by 
means of a will; however, in the absence of the ability to transfer ownership of digital 
music (which is not stored in a tangible object), large collections of digital libraries may 
go unused.101 This poses a concern with respect to the value of the library and the 
costs associated with compiling it. The costs of purchasing digital content is 
comparable to the price of physical items; however, the value of these digital libraries 
is significantly diminished if they cannot be shared, sold or given away. The legal 
restrictions on sharing, giving and bequeathing content means ‘digital content exists in 
a legal black hole’.102 A legal framework which overcomes the restrictions on sharing 
content may not only facilitate a secondary market, it may also allow valuable items of 
digital content to be passed on to another.  
 
Whilst there are many overriding benefits, there are some concerns with respect to a 
secondary market. These concerns centre on the right holder and potential loss of 
revenue streams.  A detailed account of such concerns is outside the scope of this 
paper, a full investigation of these concerns would need to be undertaken prior to any 
proposed law reform. This Part has therefore confined itself to a discussion of the 
                                                        
99  See Spotify Terms of Service, https://www.spotify.com/au/legal/end-user-agreement/; See Netflix 
Terms of Use, https://www.netflix.com/TermsofUse; See YouTube Terms of Service, 
https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms. 
100 See Stamatiou P, World's Largest iTunes Collection: 849GB (2007), 
 http://paulstamatiou.com/worlds-largest-itunes-collection/, citing Glenn Wolsey, ‘Interview with Will 
Friedald’ (2007). 
101 Fottrell Q, Who inherits your iTunes library? Why your digital books and music may go to the grave 
(2012), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/who-inherits-your-itunes-library-2012-08-23. 
102 Fottrell, n 101.  
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primary benefits of such a secondary market. The final Part will discuss the possible 
legal framework to implement a secondary market for digital content in Australia.  
PART IV. AUSTRALIA AND THE POTENTIAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
RESALE OF DIGITAL CONTENT 
 
The Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) sets out the exclusive rights of an Australian copyright 
holder.103 Australian copyright law does not contain ‘a general right to control the 
distribution’ of copyright material and further there is no express provision providing for 
the exhaustion of this right upon first sale.104  To prevent distribution in Australia, 
copyright holders rely on the exclusive rights to  ‘reproduce’, ‘publish’, ‘copy’, 
‘broadcast, or ‘communicate to the public in electronic form’.105 Any unauthorised, or 
unlicensed use of copyright works amounts to copyright infringement.106 Australia has 
not previously needed to consider first sale on the basis that the secondary sale of the 
work (in a traditional physical market), would not in itself be infringing.107 
 
In terms of a secondary marketplace, the reproduction, publication and communication 
rights may be infringed by creating unauthorised reproductions of copyright work and 
supplying these reproductions to the public in the marketplace. 108  Pursuant to 
Australian law, any online transfer, sale or sharing of digital content is likely to attract 
copyright infringement if the act involves a reproduction of the material. Similarly, the 
publication right affords the right holder the ability to publish, or authorise another to 
supply reproductions of the work to the public.109 The scope of this right provides that 
publication is only for the first publication of the material. 110  This right is closely 
connected to the communication right whereby copyright material is communicated or 
made available to the public. Any action involving the publication, supply of 
reproductions, or communication of the work to the pubic without the consent of the 
right holder is likely to attract copyright infringement. Without a clear right to alienate 
                                                        
103 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 31. 
104 Fitzgerald, B. et. al. ‘Internet and E-commerce Law Business and Policy’ (Thomas Reuters, Australia 
2011), 271, See 17 UCS §106(3), the copyright holder has the exclusive right “to distribute copies or 
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public”.  
105 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 31; Fitzgerald, n 104, 271.  
106 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 31 and 29.  
107 Unless one of the exclusive rights were infringed or the right to prevent unauthorised reproductions of 
the work from being supplied; See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 31 and 38.  
108 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 31 and 38.  
109 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 29. 
110 See Avel Pty Ltd v Multicoin Amusements Pty Ltd (1990) 18 IRP 443 following Infabrics Ltd v Jaytex 
Shirt Co. Ltd [1981] a All ER 1057. This case highlights that the scope of the publication right applies to 
the first publication of the work in a State or Territory; K. Weatherall "On Technology Locks and the Proper 
Scope of Digital Copyright Laws - Sony in the High Court" (2004) 26(4) Sydney Law Review 613, 623. 
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digital copyright content in a way that allows for secondary sale, and in the absence of 
a licence or consent from the copyright holder to use the content in a secondary 
market, the resale of digital content is most certainly illegal in Australia. 
 
The ALRC’s Final Report on Copyright and the Digital Economy made a number of 
recommendations to change Australian copyright law, including recommending a fair 
use provision modelled on the US fair use exception. Limited by the terms of reference, 
the ALRC were not able to consider secondary sale. A number of submissions in 
response to the ALRC’s Discussion and Issues papers called for the ALRC to address 
the possibility of introducing a first sale doctrine into Australian copyright law. 111 
Nevertheless, the ALRC Final Report did not mention first sale or exhaustion and there 
were no recommendations to reflect the absence of such doctrines in Australian 
copyright law.  
 
The ALRC is not the only Australian review body to overlook first sale 
considerations.112 In August 2015 the Australian Government announced that a further 
inquiry was to be undertaken by the Productivity Commission into Australian’s 
intellectual property system.113 The terms of reference of this inquiry do not consider 
first sale as an issue requiring investigation. The Issues Paper, which was released in 
October 2015, also did not make mention of exhaustion or first sale. Despite this, it is 
suggested that the prominent decisions involving digital first sale in other jurisdictions 
discussed in this article should prompt Australian policy-makers to at least recognise 
digital first sale as an issue requiring evaluation and investigation.  
 
The most effective legal framework to permit a secondary digital market in Australia 
gives rise to some difficult questions. The traditional first sale and exhaustion law in 
other jurisdictions provide some guidance for Australian law reform; however there is 
no global consensus on the most appropriate way to legally establish such a secondary 
market. Even in jurisdictions with express first sale doctrines, the status of digital 
secondary sales remains uncertain; and there are competing theories with respect to 
the potential framework. Of particular relevance are two such theories: firstly, 
development of a common law principle of exhaustion through the Australian courts; 
                                                        
111 AIMIA Digital Policy Group Submission in Response to Issues Paper No 42 (2012), Submission 261; 
Ebay Response to Discussion Paper No 79 (2013), Submission 751; and Innovation Perspectives 
Response to Issues Paper No 42 (2012), Submission 159.  
112 See The Australian Government Productivity Commission, ‘Copyright Restrictions on the Parallel 
Importation of Books’ (2008), http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/books. 
113 The Australian Government Productivity Commission, ‘Intellectual Property Arrangements’, (2015), 
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and secondly, a statutory provision incorporated into national legislation, either 
mirroring the first sale doctrine, or an express statutory right providing for certain types 
of digital resale. 
 
While the scope of the US first sale doctrine remains open to judicial interpretation, US 
the courts have the ability to recognise a common law principle of exhaustion along 
similar lines to that recognised in the EU.114 As in the US, the Australian judiciary has 
the ability and discretion to recognise a principle of exhaustion through the 
development of the common law. Building on the first sale doctrine, exhaustion offers 
a broad entitlement for consumers to alienate, ‘…modify or adapt their copies’.115 By 
broadening the common law approach to exhaustion, there is an inherent flexibility for 
courts to adapt and change along with technology.116 If a common law principle of 
exhaustion was developed to apply specifically to digital goods, the needs of our 
technologically driven society may be more effectively addressed. Despite the 
discussions occurring in other jurisdictions, the Australian Courts are yet to entertain 
the possibility of a common law principle of exhaustion. 
 
In addition to the common law principle of exhaustion, there has been some discussion 
regarding the possibility of global principle of exhaustion being established within the 
current international treaties.117 Such a principle may be a viable option in theory, 
however, due to difficulty achieving multilateral consensus in the global marketplace, 
and the delays associated with passing a treaty, domestic action may be more efficient 
and timely. A common law principle may be effective, however in the context of 
Australian law a prescriptive principle of exhaustion may be more desirable.  
 
Recent Australian law reform debates have focused on the fair dealing exceptions 
found in the Copyright Act, with proposals for expanding the exceptions.118 Importantly, 
any exceptions to Australian copyright law would need to carefully consider the 
implications of imposing limitations on the exclusive rights afforded to rights holders 
and consumers alike. In this context, one possible reform would be to enact a fair 
dealing exception to expressly allow for the resale of digital content. In circumstances 
of sharing and giving, such provision would need to consider reproduction (to transfer 
content to a new consumer), publication and communication rights. This would ensure 
                                                        
114 Perzanowski and Schultz, n 16, p 892. 
115 Perzanowski and Schultz n 14, p 2114; Kiplng v GP Putnam’s Sons, 120 F 631 (2nd Circuit) 1903).  
116 Perzanowski Schultz, n 16, p 946. 
117 Morris, n 58, pp 107-108.  
118 See ALRC Final Report, n 3. 
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that certain uses of the work such as sharing and giving does not attract infringement 
claims. A new fair dealing exception would be consistent with Australia’s obligations 
pursuant to current international treaties. Such a provision is explicitly taken into 
consideration under the WIPO Copyright Treaty in Article 6 (2), which provides that 
‘Contracting Parties’ are free to determine any provisions relating to exhaustion and 
copyright material.119 Further, any fair dealing provision would be consistent with the 
international standards pursuant to the three-step test.120 Such an exception would 
also be consistent with some of the ALRC’s recommendations in favour of new fair 
dealing provisions for specific socially valuable uses of copyright material. 121  A 
thorough analysis and investigation of the potential legal implications of an express 
provision should be investigated, in addition to other potential legal frameworks. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The recent decisions of Capitol Records and UsedSoft indicate that digital secondary 
sale is a prevalent issue outside of Australia. 122 Copyright law needs to reform to 
recognise the developments in technology and social practises. It is conceded that the 
issue of resale of digital content is a legislatively complex problem that requires further 
investigation. What is postulated is that in order for Australia and the rest of the world 
to effectively balance the rights of copyright holders with those of consumers, a 
marketplace for the resale of digital content needs to be considered.  Whilst the legal 
framework of such a market lies in the legal grey area, the outcomes from recent 
international decisions provide a springboard for the Australian Parliament, judiciary 
and review bodies to consider. 
 
Within Australia, a digital secondary market would be legally difficult to establish. One 
plausible suggestion may be an Australian equivalent of the first sale doctrine or 
principle of exhaustion. Such legal application should be reflective of the importance 
of providing a secondary market for all forms of content, one that reinforces the rights 
of consumers and applies equally to physical and digital goods alike. It may be 
                                                        
119 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, opened for signature 20 December 1996, 
ATS 26 (entered into force on 6 March 2002).  
120 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act), opened for signature 24 
July 1971, [1978] ATS 5 (entered into force on 15 December 1972), Art. 9(2); Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, opened for signature 15 April 1994, ATS 38 (entered into force on 
1 January 1995). 
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preferable to establish a specific fair dealing exception providing for the sale of the 
digital content. The outcomes associated with prescribed statue often provide more 
certainty than those associated with broad doctrines.123  It is acknowledged that the 
issue of legal framework is complex and uncertain. It is a matter that requires 
investigation and inquiry from the government. Whether it is in the form of a statutory 
exception, or through judicial interpretation, the establishment of a secondary market 
is an essential step to ensure copyright law is balanced. Such a market would ensure 
that access to material is not restricted based on affordability and may assist in 
addressing consumer welfare through an alternate avenue. A secondary market would 
support the underlying rationale of copyright law; it would provide a support to the 
primary mode of distribution, ensuring that access to content is available to a wider 
number of consumers at a price that is not socially discriminatory.124  Recent Australian 
law reform did not recognise the importance of digital secondary sale. Whether the 
Australian Government will address such an important issue in the future is yet to be 
determined.  
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